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REVIEW ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
IN CERCLA ACTIONS

Stephen D. Ramsey
Sidley & Austin
Washington, D. C.

Getting A Handle On Hazardous Waste Controls
A short course sponsored by the
Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado School of Law
June 9-10, 1986

I.

OVERVIEW.

A.

The government has adopted the position, in litigation
and in the administration bill to amend CERCLA,
that review of decisions for CERCLA remedial actions
is confined to the administrative record.

1.

Government view:

United States' Supplemental

Reply Memorandum in United States v. Occidental
Chemical Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D. N.Y.).

2.

Opposing view:

Defendants' Joint Memorandum

in United States v. AVX Corp., No. 83-3882-Y
(D. Mass.).

3.

See United States v. Ward, No. 83-63-CIV-5
(E.D. N.C., Sept. 9, 1985); Lone Pine Steering
Comm, v. United States, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir.
1985).

B.

The CERCLA procedure for remedial actions.

1.

The lengthy procedure leading to selection
of remedial action is set out in the National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan

1

("NCP"), 50 Fed. Reg. 47912 (November 20,
1985); see 40 C.F.R. §300.68.

a.

The first stage is the preliminary
Assessment/Site Investigation ("PA/SI"),
a quick look at the site.

(i)

b.

§300.64

Next, the site is proposed to be placed
on the National Priorities List ("NPL");
proposal is accompanied by opportunity
for comment.

(i)

c.

§300.66

The site is then listed on the NPL.

(i)

§300.66

(ii) See Eagle-Pitcher Industries v. EPA,
759 F .2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(consolidated industry challenge
to the original NPL).

-
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Next, the government or private parties
prepare a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study ("RI/FS") - a comprehensive site
analysis and evaluation of alternative
remedial actions.

(i)

§300.68(d)

(ii) Note:

The RI/FS can and often does

precede NPL promulgation.

EPA then allows informal comment on RI/FS,
and a public meeting; public comment is
usually restricted to three weeks.

(i)

§300.67

EPA's selection of the "cost-effective"
remedial action is embodied in the Record
of Decision ("ROD") and accompanying staff
analyses.

(i)

§300.68 (i)

The ROD allows EPA to commit Superfund
monies to take remedial action.

(i)

h.

§300.68 (j); CERCLA §104

The government can then commence a
cost-recovery action against potentially
responsible parties ("PRP's") to recoup
Superfund expenditures.

(i)

CERCLA §107

(ii) This is the stage at which the court
reviews the merits of the remedial
action, to determine whether the
remedial action was consistent with
the N C P .

The courts have rejected
(

PRPs' attempts to get review of EPA

j

decisions prior to government initiatdh
of a cost-recovery action.

E.g.,

j
J

Lone-Pine Steering Comm, v. United

*|

States, supra.

II.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS:

REVIEW ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD.

(WHAT IS IN THE RECORD?

HOW IS IT COMPILED?

WHAT IS

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW?)

A.

Review confined to materials before decision maker
at time he made decision.

-
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1.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U .S . 402 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U .S .
138 (1973); EPF v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).

2.

Thus, accepting the government's view, review
would be confined to the ROD and the back-up
materials, including the RI/FS and public
comments.

B.

The heart of the government's position is its desire
to avail itself of the favorable arbitrary or capricious
standard of review.

1.

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Sierra Club
v. EPA, 540 F .2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

a.

Review would not be under the substantial
evidence test.

(i)

See Judge Friendly's opinion in
Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., v .
Cox, 592 F .2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979),
comparing the arbitrary or capricious
and substantial evidence tests.

-
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b.

Not preponderance of evidence test.

(i)

American Paper Institute v. American
Electric Power Service Corp., 103
S.Ct. 1921 (1983) .

c.

Not trial de novo.

(i)

Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d
1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) .

d.

Thus, the government would not have to
show its decision is the best, only that
it was based on the record and not in
contravention of law or policy.

(i)

Small-Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task
Force (11SRTF11) v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506
(D.C. Cir. 1983).

C.

Deference to decision maker.

1.

On matters of legal interpretation.

a.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc, v. NRDC, 104 S.Ct.
2778 (1984) .

-
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b.

On technical and factual matters, deference
is greatest under the arbitrary or capricious
standard.

(i)

D.

SRTF v. EPA, supra.

Procedure.

1.

The government will likely certify the record
to the court.

a.

2.

C f . Fed.R.App.P. 16, 17.

Much like a summary judgment procedure;
government will argue review based on evidence
in the record.

E.

Questions of permissible level of discovery.

1.

There are tight restrictions on probing the
mental processes of the decision maker under
the arbitrary or capricious standard.

(i)

Morgan v. United States, 304 U . S.l

(1 9 3 8 ) ;

United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409
(1 9 4 1 ) .

-
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2

.

Alternatives are interviews with government
employees, or

3.

Possible use of Fed.R.Civ.P. 27 to perpetuate
testimony.

F.

.

There are limited circumstances in which the reviewing
court will look beyond the administrative record.

1.

See S. Stark & S. Wald, "Setting No Records:
The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in
Review of Administrative Action," 36 Ad.L.Rev.
333 (1984) .

a.

For example, courts may take testimony
in light of failure to explain agency
action adequately, failure to consider
or document consideration of relevant
factors, bias and prejudgment.

b.

Also, discovery generally is allowed to
determine scope of the record.

(i)

See, e .g ., NRDC v. Train, 519 F .2d
28:7 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

(plaintiffs

in the district were "entitled to

-
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an opportunity to determine, by
limited discovery, whether any other
documents which are properly part
of the administrative record have
been withheld.")

G.

Bear in mind that district courts, unlike courts
of appeal, are generally unfamiliar with record
review.

This suggests opportunities to expand the

record.

III. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.

A.

Record review is a double-edged sword.

1.

The corollary of record review is that the
government's record must support its action.

2.

The private parties have opportunities to help
shape a favorable record, and to take advantage
of favorable gaps in the record.

B.

Keep up with the government.

1.

Use of Freedom of Information Act, broadly and
often, and challenge withholding of relevant
documents.

-
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2.

Attempt to compel the government to use
a docket system.

a.

C f . Clean Air Act §307 (d) .

b.

There is an added appearance of
arbitrariness and procedural sloppiness
if the government refuses.

C.

Memorialize all favorable communications and
positions in writing.

1.

Helps ito shape a favorable record.

2.

Artful use of the nBook-of-the-Month-Club"
response ("If we do not hear from you, we
assume you agree with us.").

D.

Take full advantage of every opportunity to
comment.

1.

PA/SI (EPA may refuse to consider these
comments - see point III. E., infra) .

2.

NPL proposal.

-
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3.

RI/FS.

4.

Use of creative administrative practice,
e.g., petition for reconsideration of Record
of Decision, particularly when the PRP's
have a well-documented, less expensive
alternative remedial plan.

E.

Force the government to respond to your comments.

1.

And, document when they do not, to lay
foundation for later challenge.

F.

Make sure the government's record contains what
you want.

1.

Constant monitoring and supplementing of
record.

2.

Avoid a judicial dispute on scope of record —
it is far better to get your documents in
up front than to argue their relevance
after-the-fact.

G.

Watch for possible bias and prejudgment.

-
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1

.

Particularly at stages of site listing,
remedy selection.

2.

State and federal governments are under
pressure to tell public what they will do,
and they often get ahead of the process.

3.

Failure of government to document ex parte
contacts.

H.

IV.

Organize PRP effort for maximum impact.

MOUNTING THE SUCCESSFUL LEGAL CHALLENGE.

A.

Substantive challenges.

1.

Lack of record support for the selected
remedy.

a.

Greater Boston Television Corp. v .
FCC, 444 F .2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert, denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971).

2.

Government's failure to take account of
contrary positions.

-
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ASARCO v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
1980); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).

3.

Government's failure to adhere to NCP, its
own guidance policies and procedures;
including sampling and analysis techniques.

a.

See "Violations By Agencies of Their
Own Regulations," 87 Harv. L. Rev.
629 (1974).

4.

But beware possible bars on challenging
underlying models —

a.

Eagle-Pitcher, supra.

Thus, important to maintain distinction
between challenging model or policy
itself, and challenging application
of the model or policy.

Latter may

be allowed, former may not.

Eagle-Pitcher,

supra.

b.

And, may be able to challenge policy
indirectly, e.g., challenge to failure

-
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to delete site from NPL as way of
challenging EPA policy of requiring
full RI/FS even when remediation
complete before listing.

5.

Use of administrative stare decisis -- EPA
collects and may be publishing its RODS.
EPA has an obligation to follow its
administrative precedents, or to explain
its deviations.

The potential for inconsistent

agency decisions increases as RODs are delegated
to Regional Administrators.

B.

Procedural challenges.

1.

Inadequate opportunity for public comment,
especially when the government relies on
llth-hour documents.

a.

Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298
(D.C. Cir. 1981) .

2.

Failure to document ex parte contacts,

a.

Sierra Club v. Costle, supra.

-
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3.

Final action that departs significantly
from "proposed" action —

the "logical

outgrowth" test.

a.

4.

SRTF v. EPA, supra.

Failure to consider full range of practicable
alternatives to selected remedial action.

a.

See, generally, the cases arising
under Section 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act., e .g., Druid
Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc v. FHWA, 23
E.R.C. 1663 (11th Cir. 1985).

C.

Due process considerations.

1.

See, generally, the arguments advanced
in Defendants' Joint Memorandum in United
States v. AVX Corp., supra.

a.

Lack of meaningful notice and opportunity
for comment.

b.

Lack of hearing (opportunity to
confront and cross-examine witnesses)
at any stage.

-
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c.

Lack of pre-enforcement review, and
the "sufficient cause" defense.

(i)

Wagner Electric Corp., supra,
and cases cited therein.

d.

Also, the government's position that
previously promulgated models and
policies are immune from review raises
due process concerns.

(i)

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. EPA, 434
U.S. 275 (1978)

(Powell, J.,

concurring).

e.

For another approach, compare the
procedures used by the Corps of
Engineers under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.

(i)

Moretti v. Hoffman, 526 F.2d
1311 (5th Cir. 1976); Buttrey
v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170
(5th Cir. 1982) .

D.

Uncertain effect of a government loss.

-
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1.

Inappropriateness of the typical remand
order, when remedial work is already done.

2.

V.

Trial de novo, or outright loss by government.

POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF RECORD REVIEW FOR OTHER CERCLA
ACTIONS.

A.

Removal actions.

B.

Enforcement actions under §106.

1.

Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F.Supp.
736 (D.Kan. 1985) .

VI.

POSSIBLE CERCLA AMENDMENTS —

LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION

OF GOVERNMENT POSITION.

A.

H.R. 2817 would require EPA to establish an
administrative record and would impose the
arbitrary or capricious standard of review.
The Senate bill has no similar provision.

-
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SETTLEMENT POLICY SUMMARY

Stephen D. Ramsey
Sidley & Austin
Washington, D.C.

Getting A Handle On Hazardous Waste Control

A short course sponsored by the
Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado School of Law
June 9-10, 1986

Settlement Policy Summary

The government published its "Interim CERCLA
Settlement Policy" on November 29, 1984.

Although billed

only as guidance for analyzing settlement proposals in
superfund cases, the ten sections of the policy actually set
forth the overall enforcement philosophy for the superfund
program.

The policy is an attempt to distill the

government's collective experience in the litigation and
settlement of superfund cases in order to advise affected
parties of the course it will follow in selecting cases for
prosecution, targeting parties as defendants, conducting
negotiations and evaluating settlement proposals.

The policy

is important both as an expression of new concepts as well as
a formal statement of operating principles.

For example, the

government's unequivocal statement of its willingness to
consider and accept settlement proposals of less than 100% of
cleanup is an important public clarification of its position.
Similarly, the removal of the requirement that potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) be willing to undertake or pay for
80% of cleanup as a condition precedent to negotiation

has been deleted from the initial draft of the policy.

This

is an important initiative intended to spur settlement
proposals.

Underlying the policy is an intention to vest more
authority and flexibility in the conduct of negotiations and
the evaluation of settlement proposals in regional EPA
offices.
result,

The evaluative criteria are subjective.

As a

line personnel will be the most influential in making

the case specific,

factual determinations that will

ultimately drive the decision making process.

The policy can be broken into five main parts:

1.

Enforcement philosophy (Section I)

2.

Litigation priorities and defendant selection
(Section VIII)

3.

Information release policy (Section III)

4.

Settlement evaluation guidelines (Sections II, IV,
V, IX and X)

5.

Scope of release and contribution (Sections VI and
VII)

1.

Enforcement Philosophy

Section I of the policy reaffirms EPA's enforcement
resolve while recognizing the need for negotiated settle
ments.

The policy outlines an agency enforcement philosophy,

the goal of which is to recover all costs of cleanup.

Yet it

also recognizes the 100% goal is unobtainable in every case.
This acknowledgement of the relevancy of such real world
considerations as case equity, party culpability,

limited

resources and fund availability provides a rationale for the
government to settle for less than 100% of cleanup after a
rigorous,

internal review of delineated, case specific

factors.

The policy is designed to allow the government

flexibility to take less than a 100% clean-up without
appearing to have abrogated its enforcement responsibilities.

The approach set out in the settlement policy is
bottomed on the government's substantial success in obtaining
more than $400 million in private party clean-up and its fear
that anything less than a "100%, clean it to background"
policy will appear to be a signal that the agency has
lessened its reliance on enforcement as a method of obtaining
cleanup.

Thus, in Part I the agency restates its basic

superfund enforcement tenants,

tempered by its experience and

understanding that not every case can or should be actively
litigated.

They are:

-3-

100% clean-up goal
strict liability standard in Section 106 and 107 of
CERCLA which is joint and several in scope
importance of negotiated private party clean-up as
necessary adjunct to fund financed and litigation
induced clean-up
pursuit of parties in litigation who refuse to
negotiate or cooperate with government
use of the fund to supplement less than 100%
settlements
relaxed information exchange requirements to
facilitate negotiations
removal of the arbitrary 80% rule as condition
precedent to negotiation.

The government’s enforcement philosophy is:
negotiated settlements whenever possible,
necessary;

litigation as

flexibility and increased delegation of authority

to regional offices,

albeit with overriding authority in EPA

headquarters.

2.

Litigation Priorities and Defendant Selection

(Part

VIII)
This section of the policy is remarkable for its
open direction to government enforcement personnel to select
cases on the basis of merit.

The factors enumerated for use

in case selection are:

-4-

substantial environmental problem
significant amounts of money involved
good factual and legal basis for establishing
liability
solvent defendant
statute of limitations problems (here the
government carefully avoids stating what it
believes to be the applicable statute of
limitation.

A good argument can be made for the

statute’s running either 3 or 6 years from cleanup
completion.

Less persuasive arguments exist for a

two year statute or the statute's running from
initiation of cleanup.

In the first case to

address the issue, United States v. Mottolo, Civil
No. 83-547D ____ F .Supp. ____ (D.N.H., March 15,
1985), the Court held the statute of limitations
for actions against the fund for natural resources
damages under Section 111 and 112 to be 3 years.
The Court held there was no statute of limitations
for Section 107 response actions.

While stopping short of articulating an absolute rule, the
policy establishes priorities for case development and
prosecution:

107 actions where all costs have been incurred

-5-

106 actions at sites not subject to fund cleanup
106/107 combinations where money has been spent,
identified injunctive relief is needed and the fund
is unavailable.

Implicitly, the policy instructs regional offices
to refer for litigation well-developed cases against solvent
defendants at sites presenting significant environmental
problems and fund financed cleanup is either completed or
will never begin.

The genesis of this section is EPA's fear

that numerous small cases will drain available resources,
making it impossible to successfully prosecute major cases.
Parties who desire to know which cases are targeted for
enforcement or cleanup should consult the Site Management
Plan (SMP) compiled by and maintained in the Region where an
NPL site is located.

The SMP gives a preview of site

activity (RI-FS, RD, etc.) and allocation of funds for work
increments on a quarter-by-quarter basis for each fiscal
year.

Availability of funds (both federal and state share),

political and public health considerations will drive
enforcement/fund lead determinations at most sites.

The

agency's experience in Section 106 cases - good results but
big resource investment - has resulted in a reluctance to
seek cleanup through injunctive litigation except in the
absence of other alternatives.

-6-

This section also discusses the way the government
chooses defendants.

Relying on joint and several liability,

the government attempts to maximize its litigative
convenience, choosing defendants for the following reasons:

site owners and operators almost always sued
-

largest manageable number of parties, primarily
based on volume, toxicity and financial viability.
The government is looking for the best case against
the smallest number of solvent defendants.

Volume

is the most important consideration in choosing a
defendant.

Toxicity comes into play as a deter

minative factor primarily with generators who might
not otherwise be joined as defendants due to the
small volume of waste for which they are
responsible
-

recalcitrance or other equitable factors relating
to cooperation with the government.

Recalcitrance

can virtually insure inclusion, past favorable
action does not generally enable PRPs to avoid
suit.

The policy states that the agency will consider not
suing companies which have settled with the government in the
first phase of a multi-phased cleanup.

It creates the

impression that the government may sue non-settlers, pursuing
the settling parties only as a last resort for any

-7-

deficiency.

To date, the government has not exhibited much

willingness to follow this approach.

The success of the

settlement policy may turn on whether the government will in
fact do so.

Unless PRPs can realize an advantage by

voluntary cooperation with the government, no incentive to
early cooperation is created.

As discussed below, this

provision,

together with the policy on releases from

liability,

is critically important to the government's

successful implementation of the settlement policy.

3.

Information Release Policy
The government's perceived and actual unwillingness

to provide PRPs with basic information about the identity and
number of contributors, type of substances,

and percentage of

total contribution at sites has been a major source of
complaint by private parties.

The absence of this

information made efforts to coalesce PRPs in order to
formulate settlement proposals and allocate costs extremely
difficult.

The settlement policy provides that this summary

information will now generally be made available unless
countervailing confidentiality or litigation considerations
predominate.

The agency will utilize all its information

gathering authority under RCRA and CERCLA to collect
information from PRPs.

See, in this regard, United States v.

Liviola, ___ F.Supp. ___ (N.D. Ohio 1985).

However, the

agency need not receive the information it seeks from PRPs

prior to its release of information to them, only within a
reasonable time.

4.

Settlement Evaluation Guidelines (Parts II, IV, V, IX
and X)
These parts of the policy describe the procedure

and substantive analysis EPA will follow in evaluating
settlement proposals.

a.

In summary, the policy provides:

minimum threshold for negotiation (Part II):

"No specific numerical threshold for initiating negotiations
has been established."

The policy requires only that PRPs

represent a "substantial portion" of the cleanup costs/work
to begin negotiation.

This represents a major change from

the previous requirement that 80% of cleanup costs or work be
guaranteed as a condition precedent to negotiations.

b.

partial settlements are acceptable:

The

government will accept settlement offers of less than 100% of
costs or cleanup.

This is among most important policy

statements contained in the settlement policy.

If flexibility

does not result from the government's implementation of the
policy, a litigative log jam be created.

Procedurally, EPA

staff must prepare a case evaluation prior to initiating
negotiations which will be reviewed by EPA headquarters for
national consistency and issues of policy or legal precedent.

-9-

The evaluation must consider the settlements criteria set out
in Part IV of the policy.

The policy identifies three general categories of
cases which may be appropriate for partial settlement:

i

cases where evaluation using Part IV
settlement criteria justify settlement for
less than 100%.

Typically, these cases will

turn on factual and legal strengths and
weaknesses.
ii

cases "where the unwillingness of a relatively
small group parties to settle prevents the
development of a proposal for a substantial
portion of costs or the remedy."

The purpose

here is to isolate and punish recalcitrant
PRPs and reward those who cooperate in
achieving settlements.
iii

cases which regardless of their strength or
weakness are too small to warrant all out
litigation.

These include:

administrative settlements where total
cleanup costs are less than $200,000
claims in bankruptcy
de minimis contributors.

Although the

meaning of de minimis is unclear,
generally refers to volume.

-10-

it

Toxicity is

a secondary factor, but high volume,

low

toxicity wastes are unlikely to be an
acceptable candidate for settlement as a
de minimis generator.

Moreover, the de

minimis provision may be illusory.
Because the law of release and the
respective rights among jointly liable
PRPs is unclear, the government may view
settlement as too dangerous to its
remaining rights against other PRPs to
entertain.

c.

Partial (phased) Cleanup (Part V):

The govern

ment is willing to enter into agreements for a phase of an
entire cleanup (as distinguished from less than 100% of the
cost of cleanup described above).

Thus, EPA will consider

offers to undertake surface cleanup or other planned
removals.

However, EPA still will not as a general rule,

allow PRPs to undertake only an RI-FS.

The prevailing view

within EPA remains that negotiating about the RI-FS is too
resource intensive and results in delay which could otherwise
be spent cleaning up the site.

Rather, EPA finds it less

expensive and more efficient to undertake the RI-FS itself.
However, current EPA guidance allows participation by PRPs in
the RI-FS process.

See EPA Guidance Document "Participation

of Potentially Responsible Parties in RIFS Development"
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(3/20/84).

More guidance in performing RI-FS is expected to

be published by EPA in the near future.

The phased settlement approach has been utilized by
EPA with success.

In many cases, the approach to source

control may be obvious - e.g. removal and capping - whereas
the selection of further remedial action is unknown or
requires additional study.

The agency has regularly left

the question of ultimate remedy open to further negotiation
or litigation in exchange for performance of the initial
phase of cleanup by PRPs.

So long as PRPs can accept the

open-ended nature of this contingent liability, this approach
will undoubtedly continue to be acceptable to EPA.

Phased

settlements involving source control may well be to the
advantage of all concerned.

First,

it removes the hazard

reducing the continuing contamination and, presumably,
cost of ground water cleanup. Second,
on other, more immediate problems.

the

it enables EPA to act

Finally,

it builds

equities for PRPs with the governmental agencies, the courts
and the public.

A difficult, unsettled question is whether EPA will
settle for less than 100% of a particular phase of cleanup.
The agency agreed to do so in early settlements - Chem-Dyne,
South Caroline Recycling Disposal Inc.

(SCRDI) - but the

current attitude toward them is unclear.

One advantage to

the government in accepting phased settlements is avoiding

-12-

litigative costs and conserving the fund for other projects.
To the extent the government must continue litigation or
undertake fund financed cleanup at a site, the advantage to
accepting less than 100% of a phase of cleanup is marginal.
Factors such as the government’s desire to perform the work
itself to insure its adequacy, particularly at sites which
are technically complex or have a high public profile, may
militate in favor of such settlements.

d.

timing of negotiations (Part IX): EPA is

attempting to limit negotiations for private party cleanup to
60 days after completion of the RI-FS and the Negotiating
Decision Document (NDD) which identifies EPA's chosen remedy.
The NDD is the "bottom line" for the government in
negotiations.

In fact, EPA regularly extends the deadline so

long as there is demonstratable progress in negotiations.
The sixty day rule is a reminder to PRPs and government alike
that the negotiation process must produce results.
Otherwise,

litigation or cleanup activity will be commenced.

Due to resource constraints, the government no less than PRPs
desires to avoid litigation which is uncertain and expensive.
Therefore, even incremental progress is generally enough to
keep negotiations going and stall litigation.

e.

settlement criteria (Part IV): Part IV of the

policy contains the ten settlement criteria the government
will employ in evaluating settlement proposals.
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They express

the government's recognition that while uniformity is
desirable,

settlement decisions must be based on real world

consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of particular
cases.

Included in this calculus is the government's acute

awareness of the resource constraints it faces in conducting
litigation at each site.

Thus, the government is forced to

choose to litigate fully only a few cases.
must balance the cost-benefit of litigation:

In so doing, it
the amount of

cleanup or costs recovered against the cost of obtaining it,
the public health implications of delay in cleanup pending
litigation and the backlog of other cases which require
resolution.

Viewed in this light, the government is under

enormous pressure to settle for the best cleanup it can
achieve as quickly as possible.

The ten criteria are:
1.

Volume of wastes contributed to site by each
P RP.

This is the most important consideration

to the government and PRPs in evaluating
settlements and allocating liability for
cleanup costs.

Toxicity is a factor, but

volume is the real measuring stick in
determining whether an offer is acceptable.
Assuming the government can meet its burden of
proof under superfund, PRPs should not
generally expect to be able to settle for less
than their percentage share by volume of
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wastes at a site.

Indeed, the government will

seek a premium to settle all liability.
Typically, utilizing a joint and several
liability theory, the government sues or
negotiates with PRPs representing less than
100% of waste by volume and expects them to
pay 100% or close to it.

The government

leaves it to the settlers to obtain the
overage from PRPs with whom the government has
not negotiated or joined as a party.

Thus,

in

structuring a settlement offer, PRPs must be
able to demonstrate that more than a "fair
share" by volume is represented.

The exact

amount will obviously depend on the strength
of the government's case and the difficulty
the government will have in presenting its
case in court.

The government has declined to

act as a policeman of allocation formulae and
seldom has looked behind a group's offer to
evaluate its adequacy as to individual parti
cipation.

The government's view, based in

large part on resource constraints, is that
allocation is a function best left to PRPs.
2.

Nature of the wastes contributed.

The

government will consider toxicity in evalua
ting a settlement.

Based on past history,

volume is a base line for cost allocation.
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Thus, toxicity is utilized primarily to
increase the amount of money the government
will accept in settlement from a low or medium
volume generator of a highly toxic waste.
Mobility, persistence and exacerbated
difficulty in cleanup attributable to
particular wastes are also considered by EPA.
The presence of a low volume high toxicity
waste can make settlement difficult if that
generator is not part of the settling group.
EPA may be reluctant to settle with high
volume PRPs which leaves a case primarily
against a low volume defendant who will argue
that disproportionate cost allocation is
inappropriate.

EPA's willingness to take the

litigation risk associated with that type of
settlement will be a bellweather for its
sincerety in utilizing the settlement policy.
3.

Strength of evidence tracing the wastes at the
site to the settling parties.

EPA must prove

that a PRP's wastes have been sent to and were
present at a site to establish liability under
CERCLA.

The government claims it will adjust

its willingness to accept less than 100% of
cleanup in direct proportion to the strength
or weakness of its evidence connecting PRP to
the site.

In practice, the government has not
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shown a general willingness to consider the
circumstances of single PRPs where there are
multiple parties.

Thus, a PRP may not be able

to settle with the government until a group
offer is made and substantial cost for attor
ney and consulting fees incurred.

As with the

de minimis contributor, unless EPA will
evaluate a PRP's claim of weak evidence, this
factor may be of little aid to anyone other
than the government or a group of PRPs in
making or evaluating a comprehensive settle
ment proposal.
4.

Ability of the settling parties to p a y .
Insolvency or limited assets are factors to be
considered.

The government does not intend to

waste its resources against a party who cannot
satisfy a judgment.

Installment payments and

other alternatives to lump sum payment are
authorized.

The government has not shown a

predilection to allow parties to make demon
strations of limited financial capacity.
Moreover, the government applies a stringent
test which essentially turns on whether a
defendant would become bankrupt if forced to
pay 100%.

PRPs should be prepared to offer

documentation of insolvency and accept an
onerous pay out schedule (both as to amount
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and time) to obtain less than 100% settlement
on financial capacity grounds.
5.

Litigative risks in proceeding to trial.

This

section reiterates the admonition about good
quality evidence contained in #3, adding
requirements of admissability and adequacy.

A

third factor - availability of defenses under
Section 107(b) - is also considered.

The

shortness of this section belies its
importance.

In fact, the government is most

vulnerable in the area of the quality and
quantity of evidence.

Particular problems

which should be explored by PRPs include:
Maintenance of appropriate chain of
custody.

The number of people involved

in sampling and analysis makes proof
difficult and onerous for the government.
Maintenance of required testing and other
scientific procedures and protocols.

EPA

labs often do not comply with their own
testing protocols.
Availability and quality of cost
documentation.

The Agency has had great

difficulties in the timely and complete
collection of cost documents in superfund
cases.

As with lab samples, chain of

custody is a problem for the government

-18-

given quality assurance/quality control
problems and the number of persons who
may be needed to authenticate and make
the records admissable.
costs are involved,
are magnified.

Where state

the problems of proof

The government is well

aware of the evidentiary problems it
faces in the proof of its superfund
cases.

PRPs should always request cost

documentation (not just summaries) from
the government prior to entering into
settlement in cost recovery cases.
EPA will evaluate Section 107(b)(3)
defenses in determining the worth of its
case.

As discussed elsewhere, the

defenses are restrictive.
Act of God, act of war,

solely caused by

third party - and analogous defenses
under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act
have been narrowly construed in favor of
the government.

As with almost all

equity factors, the government's initial
settlement position will not typically
reflect any reduction for them.

PRPs

must ferret out and advocate them at the
bargaining table.
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6.

Public interest considerations.

This

section responds to the "Seymour"
situation where the state cannot pay its
matching share as required by
§ 104(c)(3)(C) of CERCLA.

It enables the

government to balance the public interest
in obtaining expeditious cleanup against
the unavailability of federal funds.

The

government will undoubtedly limit the
scope of this provision to justify
settlement of less than 100% "only when
there is a demonstrated need for a quick
remedy to protect public health or the
environment."
7.

Precedential value.

A restatement of

government resolve for strong
enforcement.

This section actually is

designed to be used more for rejecting
what may be an otherwise acceptable
settlement to establish good legal
precedent.

In fact, the government has

not and will not turn down good
settlements to make good law.

Given the

magnitude of the government's enforcement
docket and the impetus for settlements,
this provision will likely receive little
use.

More likely it will be used as a

"puffing" mechanism in negotiations to
underscore the government's litigative
resolve as a negotiating chip with PRPs.
8.

Value of obtaining a sum certain.

By

using present value calculations the
government will,

in effect, discount

settlements in current dollars which may
not be payable for several years.

Using

a model developed for this purpose, the
agency hopes to be able to encourage
"cash out" settlements.
9.

Inequities and aggravating factors.

A

general catchall for the use of equitable
considerations.

By its terms it would

allow the government to consider such
actions as voluntary removal by a PRP
undertaken prior to the government’s
request that it do so.

However, so long

as a 100% policy is pursued and the
government is apprehensive that it will
appear to be lax if it does not pursue
all PRPs equally, this provision may only
be used to enhance not decrease the
amount the government will seek from
PRPs.
10.

Nature of the case that remains after
settlement.
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The decision-makers want to

know the nature of the remaining case,

if

any, that exists if the government
accepts a settlement proposal.

Factors

include the solvency and culpability of
the remaining PRPs, the quality of the
evidence against them, the equity of
proceeding for the remainder of cleanup
against them, and the resource
expenditure which the government must
make to proceed against non-settlers.

These ten guidelines are in actuality an attempt to
codify the application of common sense to the evaluation of
settlement proposals.

They serve several purposes at once.

First, they inform PRPs of the factors utilized to evaluate
their offer.

Proposals should be structured to address the

ten factors in recognition that the EPA staff personnel must
justify the settlement to management personnel utilizing
them.

Second, they instruct EPA of the factors they must

consider in evaluating settlement proposals.

Regional staff

have been delegated authority to make the subjective,
factual,

site specific determinations which will drive the

decision-making process.

PRPs should work closely and

cooperatively with staff personnel to insure that the most
favorable factual picture can be drawn which will bring a
proposal within EPA's settlement criteria.

As Part IX

indicates, headquarters EPA and, in judicial cases, the
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Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice Land
and Natural Resources Division, have final authority to
approve settlements.

The dynamics of the process are that

regional personnel will become advocates for an acceptable
proposal to the top decision-makers.

The major factors

considered by the managerial level in Washington are 1)
recommendations of staff; 2) national consistency and 3)
non-controversial nature of proposal.

Initially, partial

settlements will receive intense scrutiny, by EPA
headquarters.

However, the volume of case work and the

pressure to successfully implement the settlement policy will
make such close attention impossible in every case.

As

experience is gained, hopefully more deference will be given
to the regional offices.

All judicial settlements receive close attention in
Washington.

Department of Justice regulations require that

every filing and settlement of every superfund suit must be
personally received and approved by the Assistant Attorney
General of the Land and Natural Resources Division.

Pursuant

to a Memorandum of Understanding between EPA and the Depart
ment, judicial case can be settled unless they jointly
concur.

Thus, administrative, non-judicial settlements are

more quickly approved and consistency and legal precedent are
less a factor than if the Department of Justice must concur.
Finally, in establishing this elaborate process, EPA is
attempting to demonstrate to Congress and the public that
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settlements will be evaluated on the basis of public health,
environmental and resource considerations.

There is no magical formula for the utilization of
the settlement criteria.

The government staff will probably

boil them down and balance 1) the strength of the case and
likelihood of success, 2) the amount of money or extent of
cleanup involved, and 3) the ability of the PRPs to pay, to
arrive at a subjective evaluation of the value of the case.
The success the government has had in court, coupled with
criticism the program has received about laxity and delay
have made settlement for less than 100% difficult at best.
However, the number of cases which will arise under superfund
and the resource intensity of them has forced the government
to attempt to find a way to achieve settlements.

5.

Release and Contribution (Part VI and VII).

The issues

of the scope of release and contribution may be the most
controversial and troublesome for PRPs desiring to settle
their superfund liability of the government.

Understandably,

PRPs believe that a full release is a necessary and appro
priate incentive to settlement.

However, the government has

been unwilling, except in extraordinary circumstances,

to

give full releases from liability in superfund cases.

The

government believes that "(t)he need for finality in settle
ments must be balanced against the need to insure that PRPs
remain responsible for recurring endangerments and unknown
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conditions.”

Put simply, the science of groundwater cleanup

technology and human health and environmental effects is too
uncertain for the government to release PRPs from all contin

gent liability.

The government fears that remedial measures

may prove inadequate and lead to future endangerments or fund
expenditures whether by reason of design or construction
defects, unknown conditions or effectiveness of the remedy.
Thus, the government believes this risk of future costs or
endangerment should be borne by PRPs and not the superfund.
This is the government's position both for cost recovery and
injunctive cases,

regardless of whether the government has

approved the remedy.

The guidance contained in Part VII of the policy
does not really portend a complete release from liability.
It is intended to explain the extent of release the
government believes is possible.

If any rule can be drawn

from the policy it is that the expansiveness of the release
is directly proportional to the known effectiveness and
confidence level of the remedy.

The policy is intended to

force development of permanent remedial solutions such as
inceneration and to be a disincentive to land disposal or
containment remedies.

In the government's view, the latter

category virtually assures future remedial action will be
required.

The policy also favors off-site disposal.

However, given the vast number of non-complying RCRA disposal
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facilities, off-site disposal is being viewed as mere
transference of an inevitable environmental problem from one
site to another.

The determination of effectiveness and thus the
scope of release from future liability will obviously be
factually bound and site specific.

However,

the government

will seek consistency with a minimum set of future contingent
liabilities.

The policy states the general rule:

Regardless of the relative expansiveness or
stringency of the release in other respects, at a
minimum settlement documents must contain reopeners
allowing the government to modify terms and
conditions of the agreement for the following types
of circumstances:
o

o

where previously unknown or undetected con
ditions that arise or are discovered at the
site after the time of the Agreement may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare or the
envi ronment.
where the Agency receives additional infor
mation, which was not available at the time of
the Agreement, concerning the scientific
determinations on which the settlement was
premised (for example, health effects
associated with levels of exposure, toxicity
of hazardous substances, and the
appropriateness of the remedial technologies
for conditions at the site) and this
additional information indicates that site
conditions may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health
or welfare or the environment.

In addition, release clauses must not preclude the
Government from recovering costs incurred in responding to
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the types of imminent and substantial endangerments
identified above.

In addition to requiring the ability to reopen a
settlement to seek more relief, the policy contains
limitations on the timing and scope of release available.
Ordinarily,
cleanup.

releases are effective upon completion of the

"Cash out" settlements (so called because PRPs pay

money before cleanup costs are incurred) are appropriate
typically only when the government can reasonably ascertain
the cost of cleanup and PRPs pay a "carefully calculated
premium or other financial instrument"

(typically a bond)

"that adequately insures . . . against these uncertainties."
A bond was used in the Seymour, Berlin & Farro and A&F
Materials cases.

There are eight specifically stated

limitations to the scope of release:
A release or covenant may be given only to the PRP
providing the consideration for the release.
The release or covenant must not cover any claims
other than those involved in the case.
-

The release must not address any criminal matter.

-

Releases for partial cleanups that do not extend to
the entire site must be limited to the work
actually completed.
Federal claims for natural resource damages should
not be released without the approval of Federal
trustees.
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Responsible parties must release any related claims
against the United States,

including the Hazardous

Substances Response Fund.
Where the cleanup is to be performed by the PRPs,
the release or covenant should normally become
effective only upon the completion of the cleanup
(or phase of cleanup) in a manner satisfactory to
EPA.
Release clauses should be drafted as covenants not
to sue, rather than releases from liability, where
this form may be necessary to protect the legal
rights of the Federal Government.

A ninth limitation is that a release may only extend to work
actually done or paid for by a P R P .

As with most other parts of the settlement policy,
the possibility exists for exceptions:

In extraordinary circumstances, it may be clear
after application of the settlement criteria set
out in Section IV that it is in the public interest
to agree to a more limited or more expansive
release not subject to the conditions outlined
above.
Concurrence of the Assistant Administrators
for OSWER and OECM (and the Assistant Attorney
General when the release is given on behalf of the
United States) must be obtained before the
Government's negotiating team is authorized to
negotiate regarding such a release or covenant.

-28-

This provision is designed to allow flexibility in situations
where the relative strength of the government's case, the
availability of superfund to do the cleanup or other similar
compelling public interest is present.

Thus, a Seymour type

settlement - widely criticized when entered - could still
occur if a compelling public interest justified it.

Par

ticularly in judicial consent decrees, the government has
demonstrated limited flexibility in giving full releases from
liability.

In short, PRPs should expect to live with some

uncertainty concerning future liability unless a complete,
effective remediation program is guaranteed.

In the Hyde

Park case involving Occidental Petroleum in Niagra Falls, New
York, a full release was given in exchange for a
comprehensive, nearly open-ended program of remediation.
This case, it should be noted, was settled long before the
advent of the settlement policy and the continued
availability of such expansive language is open to question.

Related to the issue of release from liability is
the government's willingness to provide contribution pro
tection to settling PRPs.

Obviously,

settling parties wish

to be insulated from third party suits should they settle
with the government and the government pursue non-settling
parties in litigation.

Despite the policy's insistence that

continued protection is available in limited situations, the
United States has uniformly provided this protection in
multipart settlements to date.
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The potential for additional

liability for a settling PRP exists where the government
settles with A, then sues B.

If B is jointly liable with A,

it may seek contribution from A in a third party suit.
Normally, the government agrees to reduce any judgment it may
obtain against a non-settler to the extent that judgment may
be used as a basis for obtaining additional payments from the
settling PRP.

The law of contribution and release is unsettled.
The government argues,

and some courts have held that a right

of contribution exists under CERCLA.

(Indeed, almost all

proposed CERCLA reauthorization bills before Congress make
such a right express in the statute.)

The government con

tends that contribution protection clauses are unnecessary
because the stated intention of the parties in good faith
settlements to terminate contribution rights will control the
judicial construction of settlement agreements.

It relies on

the Uniform Joint Contribution Among Tortfeasors Statutes to
reach this conclusion.

The policy also commits the govern

ment to support termination of contribution rights in
litigation of non-settlers against settling PRPs.

However,

until the statute is amended or the law is settled in this
area, PRPs should continue to demand such language in settle
ment agreements.

The policy requires a written justification before
the government may agree to contribution protection language.

The justification must consider:

the policy states the

government will not provide indemnity nor pay money to adjust
subsequent contribution claims.

Finally, the government will

seek to limit the rights of settling PRPs to pursue claims
against non-settlers by requiring subordination of private
claims for contribution to the government's claim.

This has

rarely been agreed to by settling PRPs and may be more often
used as a bargaining chip than a non-negotiable demand.

Some commentators have questioned the value of a
release from liability,
nature of them.

given the contingent, open-ended

This is a fair comment, to which there is no

complete governmental response.
at least a temporary,

However,

settlements achieve

and hopefully, permanent cessation of

liability and focus the government's enforcement attention on
non-settlers.

Moreover, whatever reopener provisions may be

contained in settlement agreements, the government will
undoubtedly bear a difficult burden if it seeks additional
relief unless it can show a strong likelihood that public
health may be affected or that the remedial plan was
improperly implemented.

Where the government actually

undertakes the remedy, that burden appears even more
substantive.

Nevertheless, the balance between public

welfare and private interests will likely be tipped toward
the government where real public health concerns can be
demonstrated.
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